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Abstract
Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in
quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical paern in the
long run. e explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a ‘typical’
dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of
the explanation of these results might shed some light—a dierent light—on philosophical debates
on the laws of nature. In the explanation of such paerns, the specic form of the underlying
dynamics is almost irrelevant. e conditions required, given a free state-space evolution, suce to
account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such conditions might thus provide
a dierent account of how regular behaviour can occur. is paper focuses on drawing aention
to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and
discussing its limitations and signicance in the tractable seing of classical statistical mechanics.
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1 Introduction: Laws, stability, and typicality.
It is commonly held that there is no satisfactory philosophical account of the notion of physical neces-
sity. While it can be said that philosophers of science have made some progress in proposing candidate
accounts of laws of nature, all of these accounts have major aws, and in particular, the physical neces-
sity of laws of nature is either postulated or le unexplained.
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In this paper I propose to look at certain
branches of physics that might help to improve our understanding of the source of lawful behaviour,
at least within their restricted seings. To this end, I examine results of stability, that is, results to the
eect that a physical system will evolve into a state that is invariant over time—for instance, the state
of equilibrium of a classical gas of particles within a closed environment. More specically, we will
look at the approximate results of emergent stable behaviour that are acquired for a typical underlying
dynamics. A typical dynamics is not the same as an arbitrary dynamics, but it is close: roughly stated,
a typical dynamics is supposed to cover most of the dynamics, where ‘most’ is precisely dened.
In this paper I rst want to point out that diverse areas in physics have in common (1) a result
of the same type, i.e. a coarse-grained stable statistical paern, and (2) that such a result holds for
typical dynamics. e examples that I will cite are from classical statistical mechanics, complex systems,
quantum mechanics, and diverse projects in high-energy physics. We will reconstruct in detail the case
of classical statistical mechanics, in order to critically assess it. en, the main aim of this paper is to
point out that the structure of the explanation of such results, based on the notion of typicality, can be
signicant for philosophical debates on laws of nature and physical necessity.
e reason for focusing on the idea of typical dynamics is that such emergent stable paerns are
explained almost independently of the specic details of the underlying dynamics. e emergence of a
stable paern does not depend on the specic form of the underlying governing laws, unless the form
1
I refer to the necessitarian account (Dretske, 1977; Armstrong, 1983; Tooley, 1977), the propensities/dispositional account
(Cartwright, 1999; Mumford, 2004; Chakravary, 2005), the Humean a.k.a. Best System account (Mill, 1884; Lewis, 1999;
Earman and Roberts, 2005; Cohen and Callender, 2009), and the primitivist account (Maudlin, 2007; Carroll, 1994).
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is “ridiculously special” (Goldstein, 2001, 43). Hence I argue that a dynamical system under suitable
conditions, with no specic constraint of dynamical laws (i.e. with no deterministic or indeterministic
rules of temporal evolution, usually in the form of dierential equations), will exhibit a free state-space
evolution which will typically display, in the long run, coarse-grained stable paerns.
us, the law-like behaviour at the higher level does not require the postulation of the usual
underlying guiding rules of temporal evolution. An analysis of the suitable conditions invoked in each
particular seing might help us to understand one way in which regular behaviour can occur—a way
hitherto unnoticed in the philosophical literature on laws of nature.
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is paper is limited to outlining these results in the diverse areas of physics mentioned, and
then discussing their limitations and signicance in the seing of classical statistical mechanics. In
Section 2 I mention various projects in high-energy physics and quantum mechanics which appeal to
the aforementioned dialectics of deriving certain results for most of the underlying dynamics. en I
focus on reconstructing (in Section 3) and critically assessing (in Section 4) the approach of typicality
in classical statistical mechanics. In Section 5 I conclude by assessing the philosophical signicance
that such results may have for philosophical debates on physical necessity.
e suitable conditions aforementioned are standard general constraints that gain a prominent
role, for they can be the only modal constraints, that is, the only conditions that play the role of laws.
In the literature on complex systems theory it is well known that, besides the underlying laws, the
context gains an especially prominent role (Frigg and Bishop, 2016). Roughly stated, in the present
study it is asked whether sometimes this role is not only prominent but sucient to account for an
otherwise unconstrained motion.
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2 Overview of Approaches in High-energy Physics
Let us begin by citing various diverse projects in physics which employ the rationale discussed here.
First of all, there are those projects that seek to derive the laws (the standard model interactions) and
symmetries of modern physics from what they call a random dynamics. According to this hypothesis,
all complex Lagrangians lead, in the low-energy limit, to the laws of particle physics (Frogga and
2
To avoid confusion, a suitable dierential equation can always describe the state-space evolution of a physical system.
When I say that there is no specic constraint of dynamical laws I refer to the ontological claim that there is no governing
dynamical law postulated in the theory, i.e. there is no dynamical law that governs, or guides, the system’s evolution.
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Besides, the present assessment may inuence the plausibility of the physics projects cited: if the explanation of typicality,
as we analyse it in the context of classical statistical mechanics, is a successful (or unsuccessful) type of explanation, this tells
in favour of (or against) the projects we cite in other elds of physics that employ the same type of explanation.
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Nielsen, 1991; Chadha and Nielsen, 1983; Chkareuli et al., 2011). e authors consider a fundamental
level displaying a highly complex behaviour. is level is below the current quantum level, for quantum
mechanics does not describe a complex dynamics like the one they assume. e random dynamics is
thought to inevitably yield the emergence, within some energy limit, of all current symmetries. e
limit is the low energy domain, which corresponds to the experimentally accessible energies below
1TeV. Similar research along these lines includes the work of Mukohyama and Uzan (2013), as well as
Jacobson and Wall (2010), both of which are concerned specically with Lorentz symmetry, drawing
an analogy with statistical explanations of the second law of thermodynamics (for an aempt to frame
such projects in the philosophy of physics literature, see Smeenk and Hoefer, 2015, §4.1 and references
therein).
ere are also more speculative projects concerning entropic forces. Similarly, according to them,
the allegedly fundamental interactions, including gravity, are not fundamental but rather emergent,
arising from the statistical behaviour of lower-level degrees of freedom. See Verlinde (2011, 2017) or
the more elaborated derivation of the Einstein eld equations from thermodynamic assumptions given
by Jacobson (1995).
For decades there has also existed research on chaotic cosmologies (see e.g. Misner, 1969; Barrow,
1977; Linde, 1983) that assumes an undetermined fundamental chaotic dynamics. Today such research
concerns the instants before ination, where a chaotic dynamics is assumed as a natural default initial
state, and it is then investigated how we arrived from that state to the current standard model with
broken symmetries and frozen degrees of freedom. A recent example which recurs to this view is
Okon and Sudarsky’s (2016) aempt to explain dynamically the Past Hypothesis (the universe’s very
special initial state of low entropy).
Finally, a similar dialectics is also found in certain projects in the foundations of quantum me-
chanics: Valentini’s (1991) aempt to derive Born’s rule with a quantum analogous of Boltzmann’s
H-theorem, and Nelson’s (1966) aempt to derive the Schrödinger equation by presupposing Brow-
nian motion of classical particles. In the same vicinity, in the foundations of Bohmian mechanics,
Goldstein et al. (2010a,b); Goldstein and Tumulka (2010) aim to show that for typical Hamiltonians with
given eigenvalues all initial state vectors evolve in such a way that the wavefunction will be in thermal
equilibrium at most times. For more on these projects, which for reasons of space we can only cite
here, see Callender (2007) and references therein.
Needless to say, for obvious reasons (dealing with the early universe, at fundamental sub-quantum
levels, etc.) most of these approaches are more speculative than usual standard model physics, and thus
have diculties in delivering empirical predictions. In any case, this is irrelevant for our purpose here,
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as we are interested in the logical form of their common type of explanation and its signicance.
So, how reliable is the typicality approach in the widely discussed seing of classical statistical
mechanics? Many worries have been raised both to the typicality approach and its predecessors, such
as Boltzmann’s H-theorem. ose who raise the worries in statistical mechanics may also be skeptic
of the dialectics presented in the aforementioned physical theories, in which the underlying dialectics
is the same but is not explicitly discussed.
3 e Typicality Approach in Statistical Mechanics
Let us delve into the typicality approach as it appears in the foundations of classical statistical mechan-
ics. According to this approach, the tendency towards the equilibrium macrostate occurs for initial
conditions that are typical, where ‘typical’ is spelled out in measure-theoretical terms. Aer stressing
that this is insucient for explaining the tendency towards thermal equilibrium, the typicality of the
dynamics has to be included, which again means that it occurs for the overwhelming majority of them,
where ‘typical’ here is spelled out in topological terms.
3.1 Boltzmann’s explanation of the second law of thermodynamics
e point of departure is Ludwig Boltzmann’s project of understanding the macroscopic properties
and laws of thermodynamics in terms of their microconstituents and their laws. is was the main
mission of kinetic theory and statistical mechanics. e laer can be said to be the continuation of
the former, aer introducing irreducible probabilistic distributions not to the microconstituents but to
the states of macroscopic entities (to the state of the whole gas). Aer Boltzmann, plenty of dierent
paths have been pursued in order to obtain a reductive explanation of the laws of thermodynamics
(see Unk (2014); Unk (2006, Ch.4); Frigg (2008); cf. Albert (2000), Atkins (2007), Sklar (1993, II.3),
Filomeno (Forthcoming); for another philosophical assessment of the typicality approach see Lazarovici
and Reichert (2015, §2-3)).
In the case of the hard-sphere model of a gas in an isolated container, the macrostate towards which
all systems tend is the macrostate in which the gas has spread out all over the box, lling its volume, that
is, the ‘equilibrium macrostate’.
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Appealing to combinatoric mathematics, Boltzmann showed that the
4
We will consider the simple model of hard spheres, which models molecules of a gas closed in a perfectly isolated




of the gas, then, are the micro-constituents, and they are modelled not as point-particles but as hard spheres, each with a
certain small radius r. e gas molecules interact like billiard balls; they have no eect on one another except when they
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equilibrium macrostate is compatible with an overwhelmingly higher number of microstates. Consider
a gas composed of n particles with two degrees of freedom each. e state of this system is specied in
a 4n-dimensional phase space Γ by a point x. is point is the microstate, which species the position
q and momentum p of every particle:
x = (px1 , py1 , px2 , py2 , ...pxn , pyn , qx1 , qy1 , qx2 , qy2 ...qxn , qyn).
e phase space comes endowed with the natural Lebesgue measure µ.5 e particles obey the laws of
classical Hamiltonian mechanics; they dene a phase ow φt that is measure-preserving, which means
that for all regions,
R ⊆ Γ, µ(R) = µ(φt(R))
which is known as Liouville’s theorem. e system is perfectly isolated from the environment, so the
energy is conserved. is restricts the motion of the microstate x over a region of Γ that is the energy
hypersurface ΓE , of 4n−1 dimensions. e Lebesgue measure µ restricted to ΓE , µE , is also invariant.
From the macroscopic point of view, the gas is characterised by its macrostates, where the equilibrium
macrostate is labeled as Meq . ΓMeq is the corresponding macroregion in phase space which contains
all x ∈ ΓE for which the system is in Meq . Macrostates M supervene on microstates; a macrostate is
compatible with many dierent microstates.
e main conclusion of Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument is that the measure of ΓMeq with
respect to µE is overwhelmingly larger than any other macroregion. For the details of the proof, see
e.g. Unk (2006, 4.4), or Boltzmann (1877) himself. In fact, this region occupies almost all the energy
hypersurface, as gure 1 conveys.
e entropy is dened as the logarithm of the size of the phase space region of the macrostate:
S(M) = kB ln|ΓM |
where kB is the Boltzmann’s constant. Given the radical dierence between the sizes of the dierent
macro-regions, it was reasonable to think that the non-decrease of entropy stated by the second law
and, more generally, the tendency towards equilibrium stated by the ‘minus rst law’ (Brown and
Unk, 2001), will be overwhelmingly more likely to occur. In fact, it follows that
S(MEq) >> S(M¬Eq)
whereM¬Eq corresponds to any non-equilibrium macrostate. is would preserve the time-symmetric
Newtonian picture of the world while explaining the time-asymmetric behaviour stated by the second
collide. ‘Hard’ means that the collisions are elastic, i.e. no kinetic energy is transformed into other forms, for instance none
is lost in the form of heat. Also assumed is a large number of microscopic constituents, typically of the order of Avogadro’s
number N = 1023 or more.
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Justifying the choice of the “natural” measure is problematic; see e.g. (Sklar, 2015, Sect. 4), and Werndl (2013).
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Figure 1: An energy hypersurface, displaying the predominant size of ΓMeq , the region of all the microstates
corresponding to the equilibrium macrostate.
law. e second law would not be a strict law but an rather approximation, reecting the overwhelming
likeliness of such behaviour. Hence, there would be no real conict between reversible microscopic laws
and irreversible macroscopic behaviour.
e success of this project, however, was threatened in many ways. A number of obstacles have
been showing up ever since, such as
· the reversibility objection,
· the recurrence objection,
· the implausibility of the independence assumptions,
· how to interpret of the various probabilities,
· the status of the past hypothesis,
· the validity of the results outside the simplied models studied,
· the failure of the ergodic hypothesis, as it was proved that ergodicity is not sucient (nor necessary),
etc.
e typicality approach arguably helps in clarifying the status of the probabilities (and we believe that
many of the other issues have been correctly responded, but we can leave that aside). Our focus on the
typicality approach is however concerned with its potential signicance for understanding the general
phenomenon of emergence of lawlike behaviour, and hence, with its potential signicance in the debates
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in philosophy of science about laws of nature.
3.2 Typicality
As with Boltzmann’s approach, the main idea of the typicality approach is that a system exhibits en-
tropic behaviour because it is typical for the system to behave in this way. However, as we will see, in
contrast to Boltzmann’s approach, typicality-based explanations eschew commitment to probabilities.
Figure 2: e Galton board.
Maudlin (2011) illustrates the general idea with diverse examples: the toss of a coin, the toss of a
die, and the case of a Galton board (depicted in Figure 2). As we already know, the Galton board displays,
in the long run, a normal distribution centred in the middle basket. How should we understand the
nature of this probability distribution, that we take to be neither subjective nor epistemic? e limiting
frequency in the middle basket can be explained in terms of typicality, that is, it occurs because most of
the possible initial distributions end up with that result. In other words, the typical behaviour of a ball
falling in the Galton board is for it to fall in the centre. And this can be explained by focusing on the
typical behaviour of a ball hiing a pin, whereby it is deected to each side half the time. At the core
of this phenomenon lies the law of large numbers: if it is typical to be deected half the time to the le
and half to the right, in the long run (i.e. aer the balls have hit a large number of pins), it is expected
that the number of turns to the le and to the right will be approximately the same, leading the ball
to land approximately in the centre.
6
Typicality, then, is understood as follows: “when some specied
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e famous ‘law of large numbers’ (LLN) can be stated thus:
eorem 1. The Strong Law of Large Numbers, or Borel Strong Law.
For independent innite sequences of ips of a fair coin, let B denote the event that the proportion of successes Sn among the rst
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dynamical behaviour (like passing a single pin to the right, or passing successive pins rst to the right
and then to the le) has the same limiting frequency in a set of initial states that has measure one, that
frequency for the dynamical behaviour is typical” (Maudlin, 2011). In this quote, there is no appeal to
probabilities but to measure theory. If the set of states that leads to some outcome has measure one,
then it can be dened as typical, where the measure is calculated with a at Lebesgue measure over
the appropriate interval.
We can treat the case of a coin toss similarly. Fair coins typically land heads half the time, because
most sequences of fair coin tosses, whatever the initial state, lead to that result in the long run (see
Figure 3).
Figure 3: A coin-ip model showing the outputs of heads (black area) and tails in function of the angular speed
ω and the vertical velocity V/g (From (Diaconis, 1998))
In the case of the gas in a box, we can describe more precisely the situation as follows. Following
Frigg (2009), an element e of a set Σ is typical if most members of Σ have property P and e is one
n ips, 1
n
Sn , approaches the limit 1/2 as n→∞. at is:
B :=
{








e probability of the event B is 1, i.e. the set B has Lebesgue measure 1. (Dasgupta, 2011, §3.2)
ere is also a weak version, which permits a small dierence between the expected mean value and the eective outcome.
e weak version states that the sample average converges in probability towards the expected value. Following Loeve (1977),
where each outcome isXi, the number of trials n, the sample averageXn = (X1 +X2 + ...+Xn)/n, µ the expected value,





|Xn − µ| > ε
)
= 0
e weak version allows for a certain degree of tolerance for departing from the expected value of a nite random sequence,
which is quantied by ε. is version leaves open the possibility that |Xn − µ| > ε happens an innite number of times,
although at infrequent intervals. Instead, in the strong version, for any ε > 0, the inequality holds for all large enough n
(Ross, 2009). In any case, X1, X2, ...Xn are assumed to be an innite sequence of independent and identically distributed
integrable random variables with expected value E(X1) = E(X2) = ... = µ .
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of them. e element corresponds to a micro-state, the measure employed is the natural Lebesgue
measure µ, Σ is the set of all microstates, and P is the property of evolving to equilibrium. ‘Most’ is
thus understood in terms of having measure 1. Conversely, ‘atypical’ corresponds to having measure
0. (More exactly, the typicality measure is the induced ‘microcanonical measure’ µE restricted to the
energy hypersurface.)
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One of the results of Boltzmann’s H-theorem was that, for typical microstates





. (For an explanation of the H-theorem as a typicality statement see Lazarovici and Reichert
(2015, §3.3).)
More precisely, the denition of typical allows exceptions of subsets of measure zero or even
subsets of very small measure. A denition for the crucial notion of ‘most’ (or ‘nearly all’) is as follows.
Let AP be the set of elements that exemplify P . en,




where ε is a small positive number. See Wilhelm (forthcoming) for further details.8
Notably, it turns out that one gets a set of frequencies that are typical as an analytic consequence
of the deterministic dynamics together with a measure over initial states. And “what we in fact believe
as a purely mathematical fact is that the set of initial states with 50% limiting frequency for deections
to either side is a set of measure one” (Maudlin, 2011, 286, my italics).
4 e Typicality of the Dynamics
So far in the typicality approach, no explicit mention of the dynamics has been made. Yet it has been
argued that for the typicality explanation to suce, something else must be veried, i.e. that the results
7
e typicality measure is not a probability measure (see e.g. Werndl, 2013). Yet, a link can be established, namely that
a typicality measure µ(x) implies that P (x) ∼ 1. A suggestion for understanding this link is to interpret the probability
P as an objective probability “deriving from ranges in suitably structured initial state spaces” (Rosenthal, 2009, 2012). us,
the probability of an event x consists in the proportion of initial states that lead to x within the space of all possible initial
states. Typicality statements seem to ground this notion of deterministic probability (the rst to suggest an interpretation
of probabilities in deterministic systems was, as far as we know, Baerman 1992). Poincaré’s method of arbitrary functions
lies at the core of Rosenthal’s proposal, and thus can be considered to ground typicality statements, as also suggested in
(Filomeno, 2019b).
8
A minor terminological clarication: for the sake of clarity we (and the authors we cite) talk of ‘typical states’, ‘typical
trajectories’, etc. although strictly speaking what is dened as typical in a typicality explanation is a property P that is shared
by the elements of the set (e.g. the microstates, trajectories, or whatever else). Again, see Wilhelm (forthcoming) for a clear
discussion around typicality explanations.
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hold for most variations of the actual Newtonian dynamics. Before analyzing how the typicality of
dynamics is dened in §4.2, let us pause to analyse an important aspect regarding how Newtonian
dynamics has been treated in statistical mechanics.
4.1 A preliminary remark on the actual Newtonian dynamics
Several assumptions are made in kinetic theory and statistical mechanics, varying depending on the
philosophical approach and the system under study. e deterministic laws of classical mechanics are
assumed. Now, the assumption that will become relevant concerns the appearance of randomness: in
spite of the guiding laws being deterministic Newtonian laws, there is “an assumption about the erratic
nature of the dynamics” (Unk, 2006, 5). To quote Sklar (1993), one of the chief assumptions of the
Maxwell–Boltzmann programme, and an assumption that runs right through to the ergodic theory of
modern physics, is that at some level of description a condition of independence must be met “for the
theory to properly explain why the correct values of state parameters of gas systems can be obtained
from taking the average values of mechanical properties of the individual particles of the system”.
ere have been various strategies for underpinning this requirement of independence: the as-
sumption of equal initial probabilities, the postulation of dynamical properties as in the ergodic hy-
pothesis (which we can informally phrase as stating that, over long periods of time, the time spent
by a system in some region of the phase space of microstates with the same energy is proportional to
the volume of this region; for a formal denition see below fn 14), or rerandomization posits such as
hypotheses of molecular chaos, e.g. the Stoßzahlansatz in Boltzmann’s theory (the assumption about
the lack of correlation of the particles’ velocities before they collide). e point is that each of these
introduces a condition of randomness or independence at dierent locations in either the gas model
employed or in the method for calculating the properties of the gas (e.g. temperature, pressure, or en-
tropy). Hence a central question in the foundations of statistical mechanics: how can such posits about
the erratic wandering nature of the dynamics coexist with the deterministic guiding laws?
is apparent randomness is relevant for our purpose, as will become clearer in the next subsec-
tions §4.2 and §4.3. is apparent randomness is due to the randomizing eect of the actual dynamics,
a phenomenon which can be understood by appealing to the relation between determinism and chaos
and then between chaos and randomness. Leaving aside the discussions on the denition of these
notions, it will suce for us to understand ‘chaos’ through its most famous feature, namely high sen-
sitivity to initial conditions, and randomness in terms of a lack of correlations between a state and
its past states.
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As to the relation between deterministic classical mechanics and chaos, we can easily
9
‘Randomness’ so understood can be embedded in the framework of the Ergodic Hierarchy: a hierarchy of dynamical
11
visualize classical mechanics’ high sensitivity to initial conditions in the hard-sphere model of gure
4: the outcome direction aer the collision of one sphere with the convex spherical surface of another
sphere is highly sensitive. en the appearance of randomness can be approached via such chaotic
property of the Newtonian dynamics, since it washes out the correlations with past states, yielding
a random-looking evolution. As it is known in the dynamical systems literature, “interactions in the
domain ΓMab will be so convoluted as to appear uniformly smeared out in ΓMb . It is therefore reasonable
that the future behaviour of the system, as far as macrostates go, will be unaected by their past history”
(Lebowitz, 1999, my italics).
10 11
Figure 4: e collision of two classical circular particles is highly sensitive to initial conditions.
Having remarked on this randomizing eect of the actual dynamics, let us spell now out a typi-
cality approach which explicitly includes a specication of the features that the dynamics must verify.
4.2 A typicality explanation explicitly including the dynamics
Frigg (2009, 5) correctly remarks that typical states do not automatically aract trajectories. In other
words, before we were implicitly granting that the underlying dynamics leads to equilibrium, but this
need not be so. at is, it does not lie in the “nature” of atypical states to evolve into typical ones. It could
perfectly well be the case that a phase ow leads to anti-thermodynamic behaviour. Analogously, Frigg
properties, where the strongest property is the maximum degree of randomness, the Bernoulli property (in which there is
no correlation with any its past states), and the weakest property is the weakest degree of randomness, the ergodic property
(Berkovitz et al., 2006). ‘Chaos’ can also be dened within such a framework: Werndl (2009) denes it in terms of strong
mixing; Belot and Earman (1997), dene it in terms of the higher Kolmogorov level; while Berkovitz et al. (2006) advocate
seeing it as a maer of degree, quantied according to the position within the hierarchy. For any of these denitions, chaos is a
suciently strong randomization property, for it will be stronger than ergodicity (which is in turn stronger than ε-ergodicity,
which will be the required condition for thermodynamic behaviour, as explained later). For denitions of these notions and
their interrelation, see e.g. Frigg et al. (2016).
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Here, M is the system’s macrostate, Γ the phase space, ΓM the phase space region corresponding to M, Ma the system’s
initial macrostate, and Mb its later macrostate. ΓMab is the region of ΓMb that came via ΓMa (the set of microstates within
ΓMb that are on trajectories that come from ΓMa ).
11
One of the many details I omit for the sake of space is that the independence assumptions can be of dierent sorts. One
example is Maxwell’s assumption, which posits independence in the components of the velocity vector of each gas particle.
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points out that the approach to equilibrium will not occur just because the corresponding microstates
are more numerous. e disparity of sizes of the macroregion of equilibrium and the other regions does
not by itself imply that an entropy decrease will be atypical. us, denitions such as those oered by
Goldstein and Lebowitz (2004, 57) are unsatisfactory; the dynamics must be explicitly included in the
denition of typicality.
is amounts to go one step further and ask whether the 2
nd
law holds typically in the space of
possible Hamiltonians (relative to a measure of typicality over such space, as we will see later), that is,
explore whether most possible dynamics, subject to some general constraints, would lead the system
to exhibit thermodynamic behaviour.
e scope of this generalization will aect its signicance. For instance, it is easier (and in fact
Frigg and Werndl (2012) provide some alleged numerical support) to generalize the results in the re-
stricted class of Hamiltonians that describe gases. is would be signicant for the project in statistical
mechanics of explaining the macroscopic paerns of thermodynamics. Now, as we will discuss later, in
this paper we also want to point out that the more these results are generalized in the dynamics space,
the more they approach the goal we are aiming at, namely, a typicality explanation of coarse-grained
regular behaviour. We want to focus aention on a typicality explanation in which the results would
hold almost irrespective of the underlying dynamics. en, such an explanation could be phrased
without postulating any ‘dynamics’, that is: the results would hold irrespective of the specic physical
system’s state-space trajectory.
e idea amounts to the following. Let a generic dynamical system (Γ,Σ, µ, φt) be dened as a
probability space [Γ, Σ, µ] and a transformation φt of it.




x = f(x, t); which is autonomous of the independent variable twhich represents
time, where x is the position of the system in the n-dimensional state-space and n is the number of
degrees of freedom. en, informally, the idea amounts to seek whether not only an inverse-square
guiding law f(x, t) ∝ r−2 yields evolution to the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, but that also a, say,
inverse-cube law f(x, t) ∝ r−3 or an inverse-h law f(x, t) ∝ r−5 would yield the same result in
the long term.
If the results were suciently typical (suciently generic or suciently wide in scope), stable be-
haviour would obtain for almost any underlying dynamics; i.e. it would obtain almost independently
of how the dynamics is described. Supported by Maudlin’s diagnosis above (p. 10), we would be faced
12
As previously dened, Γ is a set of elements, interpreted as a state-space (e.g., phase space in classical mechanics); Σ is a
σ-algebra of measurable subsets of Γ; and there is a probability measure µ on Σ as usually dened. In our classical case, the
natural Lebesgue measure.
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with a non-causal mathematical explanation of some coarse-grained, in the long run, “necessary” be-
haviour. Notably, the necessity involved would not be physical necessity, but rather something like
“mathematical” or “statistical necessity” (along this line, see Filomeno, 2019b).
us, together with the statement of the previous subsection that equilibrium states are typical,
the Hamiltonian must also be typical. As dened in Section 3, take ΓE to be the hypersurface of 6n−1
dimensions of the phase space Γ in which the energy is conserved. Taking Meq to be the equilibrium
macrostate, take ΓMeq to be the macroregion consisting of all x ∈ ΓE for which the macroscopic vari-
ables assume the values characteristic for ME . en, the underlying idea of the typicality of dynamics
in statistical mechanics is expressed by Goldstein (2001, 43, my italics):
ΓE consists almost entirely of phase points in the equilibrium macrostate ΓMeq , with ridiculously
few exceptions whose totality has volume of order 10−10
20
relative to that of ΓE . For a non-
equilibrium phase point x of energy E, the Hamiltonian dynamics governing the motion x(t) would
have to be ridiculously special to avoid reasonably quickly carrying x(t) into ΓMeq and keeping it
there for an extremely long time—unless, of course, x itself were ridiculously special
Frigg and Werndl (2012) formalize which conditions a dynamics has to meet to be typical. A
rst step is to restrict the discussion to the obtaining of epsilon-ergodicity, because they argue that
this property is sucient for thermodynamic behaviour (Vranas, 1998) and (Frigg and Werndl, 2011).
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e proposal that the relevant Hamiltonians being ergodic explains thermodynamic behaviour was
originally proposed by Boltzmann, but had since then been subjected to numerous criticisms and has
accordingly been le aside by the philosophical and scientic community.
14 ε-ergodicity is meant to
be a relaxed version of strict ergodicity. It does not require that µE(B) = 0, allowing sets of initial
conditions to be on non-ergodic solutions with respect to Meq , only if the sets are of small size; that
13
In this subsection we will follow the path of these authors for the sake of the exposition, but our main goal does not
really depend on its specic actual success.
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Informally, a dynamical system is ergodic if and only if the proportion of time spent in a region A equals the measure of
A, that is, the time average is equal to the phase average. Formally, a dynamical system (ΓE , µE , φt) is ergodic if and only
if for any measurable subset A and any microstate x ∈ ΓE ,
TA(x) = µE(A)
except for a set B with µ(B) = 0; where TA(x) is dened as the time-average of a solution originating in x ∈ ΓE relative to








where χ(A) = 1 for x ∈ A and 0 otherwise. Considering B as the set of microstates which lie on non-ergodic solutions
with respect to Meq , it can also be said that system is ergodic i µE(B) = 0.
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is: µE(B) ≤ ε (with ε a small number). It is proved in (Frigg and Werndl, 2012, 9) that, for ε-ergodic
systems, initial conditions that lie on thermodynamic solutions are typical (cf. Vranas 1998). is is
what they label as ‘m-typical’ (‘m’ standing for ‘measure’). en an explicit typicality measure of the
dynamics is included. us their complete argument has this form (Frigg and Werndl, 2012, 6, 14):
Premise 1: e macrostate structure of the gas is such that equilibrium states are typical in ΓE .
Premise 2: e Hamiltonian of the gas is typical for the class of all relevant Hamiltonians.
Conclusion: Typical initial conditions lie on solutions exhibiting thermodynamic behaviour.
e task, then, is to ascertain the truth of premise 2, granting their proof in which the relevant prop-
erty P is being ε-ergodic. e Hamiltonian has to be typical with respect to a certain measure. e
measure, for a dynamical trajectory, has to be a topological measure; thus, it can be said that it has to
be ‘topology-typical’, or ‘t-typical’.
e conclusion of Frigg and Werndl (2012), I advance, is the following: the Hamiltonians are t-
typical with respect to the so-called Whitney topology, where this is proved for the hard-sphere model
and for the Lennard-Jones potentials, a subset of potentials which suces for a wide class of realistic
gases. Here we will also cite recent results that support a wider class of potentials.
Topological typicality of the Hamiltonians. To measure the typicality of the Hamiltonians in its
dynamics space, instead of the Lebesgue measure we must employ a topological notion, namely that
of ‘generic’ (aka ‘comeagre’). A set is generic if and only if its complement is a countable union of
nowhere-dense sets. Intuitively, the idea is to provide a measure able to inform us whether the other
sets are scarce.
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As we are searching for the typicality of the Hamiltonians, we seek to claim some-
thing like the following:
TypDyn: ε-ergodic Hamiltonians are comeagre/generic in the entire class of gas Hamiltonians G.
TypDyn is a rened version of premise 2 above. Unfortunately, the class G is too big. G is not easily de-
nable, so Frigg and Werndl restrict their claim to something narrower: rst, to the hard-sphere model,
then, to the sub-class L of smooth Hamiltonians that are small perturbations of the so-called Lennard-
15
In an equivalent rephrasing, a property is dened as generic if and only if it holds for a countable intersection of open
dense subsets (Wiggins, 2003, 162). In slight more detail, a property of a vector eld is said to be Ck generic if and only if the
set of vector elds possessing that property contains a residual subset in the Ck topology, where a residual subset contains
the intersection of a countable number of sets, each of which is open and dense in the topological space. k denotes the degree
of dierentiability (0 ≤ k <∞).
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Jones potential. is constraint, the authors argue, is quite acceptable given their aim of explaining
the thermodynamic behaviour of gases. Other potentials have also been studied, as we explain below.
us, rst we restrict the Hamiltonians to the smooth ones, namely, those with a xed kinetic energy
T (p, q) = p
2
2m . In the hard-sphere model (see fn 4 in p. 5), the potential V describes the abrupt repulsive
forces of elastic collisions between two particles thus: V (r) = ∞ for d < r, and 0 otherwise; where
d is the distance between the particles and r was the radius. In this model, numerical simulations and
analytical results support the claim that the motion is ergodic (as originally conjectured by Boltzmann)
for almost all parameter values. Sinai (1970) aimed to prove the assumption implicit in Boltzmann and
Gibbs that, in the hard-sphere model, the trajectories of the particles are erratic paths wandering freely
over the energy surface and spending equal times in equal hyperareas of this surface.
16
en he proved
that the hard-sphere gas is unstable and that this suces to guarantee ergodicity and mixing – see
Frigg and Werndl (2012) for details.
en a potential V (p, q) which has been thoroughly studied is the so-called Lennard-Jones poten-
tial, the most notorious and used to describe intermolecular interactions:
17
e Lennard-Jones potential is important because there is good evidence that the interaction be-
tween many real gas molecules is accurately described by that potential at least to a good degree
of approximation. Hence, whatever potentials G comprises, many real gases cluster in a subclass
of G, namely L, and so knowing how the members of L behave tells us a lot about how real gases
behave. (Frigg and Werndl, 2012, 11)
Aer that, the choice of the Whitney topology comes from a physically natural way of saying
that two Hamiltonians are close; namely, when the dierence between the Hamiltonians themselves as
well as all their derivatives is small (Frigg and Werndl, 2012, 10). e goal then is to conrm what we
summarize as:
TypDyn2: ε-ergodic Hamiltonians are generic in the sub-class L of smooth gas Hamiltonians with a
16
e proof is limited to 3 spheres; since then many proofs for a larger number of spheres have been sought, for references
see Spohn (2012, 149).
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where α describes the depth of the potential well, r the distance between two particles, and ρ is the distance at which the
inter-particle potential is 0. e potential of the entire system is obtained by summing over all two-particle interactions. e
r−12 term describes the repulsion forces at short ranges, e r−6 term describes the araction forces at long ranges (van der
Waals force or dispersion force).
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Lennard-Jones potential with respect to the Whitney topology.
Now, to prove that TypDyn2 is the case, they show that the sub-class L is generic by referring to
numerical simulations in which Hamiltonians that are ε-ergodic for the energy values dened are typ-
ical in L. In particular, Ford (1973) improved Sinai’s results, extending the proof to systems that have
aractive as well as repulsive interparticle forces. For further supportive numerical simulations see the
references cited in Frigg and Werndl (2012, 12-14). For still other types of potentials see the references
cited in Frigg and Werndl (2012, 18) and the more recent Gallagher et al. (2012) and Pulvirenti et al.
(2014).
Before these results, there could have been pessimism about the typicality of dynamics in gases,
due to the Kolmogorov–Arnold–Moser (KAM) theorem, which predicts nonergodic regions of stability.
ese are nite regions in phase space in which there are trajectories conned to perpetual quasiperi-
odic motion. In spite of the KAM theorem, the simulations of Ford (1973) provide evidence that, as the
energies and densities of particles are varied (so even in the allegedly problematic cases of lower en-
ergies or higher densities), the expected entropic behaviour obtains without evidence of KAM regions.
e KAM regions might be perfectly negligible, given that none has been found in the simulations and
“nothing known precludes their being so small as to be physically irrelevant” (Ford, 1973, 1).
At the end of the day, the numerical simulations suggest that the Lennard-Jones gas, which has
repulsive as well as aractive forces, exhibits thermodynamic behaviour. ese results conrm that
this type of gases conforms to the properties of ergodicity that were originally demanded by Boltzmann
(and Gibbs), and that we demand on behalf of a typicality account that seems to hold for most of the
dynamics.
e scope of the results. e class of Hamiltonians under consideration is not the entire set G, but
rather a subset, albeit an important one, i.e. the subset L of Lennard-Jones potentials, together with
other potentials, and with the also widely used potential of the hard-sphere model. Frigg and Werndl
argue that this is acceptable because L is the most relevant subset for realistic gases and suces for an
approximate proof. While it can be thought that this is quite satisfactory for the long-standing issue in
the foundations of statistical mechanics of explaining the tendency of gases towards equilibrium, for
our purpose it would be welcome to extend the range of dynamics as far as we can. For ultimately we
are exploring to what extent lawful behaviour can emerge for an almost arbitrary, free state space trajec-
tory under minimal constraints. e fewer constraints we invoke, the wider the scope of the typicality
explanation. us, for our purpose, we do not need to stop when typicality is proven for a wide class of
realistic dynamics of gases. We would also like to know whether typicality is proven for the unrealistic
17
dynamics.
Regarding the remaining wide and varied class of unrealistic dynamics, we could try to nd further
positive or negative results about the typicality of their properties. An exploration of typical properties
of the dynamics space has been one of the main tasks in the history of dynamical systems, in the
area known as topological dynamics. We want to conclude this section by surveying what are, to our
knowledge, its most relevant results.
4.3 Further exploration of the dynamics space
In topological dynamics we can nd results regarding the typical properties of trajectories, for instance,
random-looking behaviour such as ergodicity, mixing and the like. As has oen been pointed out, and
as we have suggested in § 4.1, a dynamics can be random-looking in virtue of its chaotic properties.
And such kind of property seems to be the required property, as for instance Frigg (following Dürr and
Maudlin) says:
the Galton Board seems to exhibit random behaviour. Why is this? Dürr’s and Maudlin’s answer
is that the board appears random because random-looking trajectories are typical in the sense that
the set of those initial conditions that give rise to nonrandom-looking trajectories has measure zero
in the set of all possible initial conditions, and this is so because the board’s dynamics is chaotic
(Dürr, 1998, sec.2). Translating this idea into the context of SM suggests that the relevant property
P is being chaotic. (Frigg, 2009, 1004)
en, in this section we will outline some key results about whether or not typical trajectories are
chaotic, or mixing, or ergodic, or other related properties. We rst cite classic results for and against
the genericity of chaos, which will be superseded because their domain is too constrained. en we
cite further results concerning wider domains of possible trajectories.
4.3.1 Classic but excessively constrained results.
ere are methods that allow us to rule out the possibility of closed orbits, and thus of periodic motion:
the methods of index theory, the existence of Lyapunov functions, and gradient systems (see any text-
book on dynamical systems, e.g., Strogatz 1994). However, these desirable results have to be studied
case by case, analysing each dynamical equation, and they say nothing about how frequently such pe-
riodic orbits are ruled out. On the negative side, the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem proves the existence
18
of periodic orbits, which is incompatible with the existence of chaotic motion (Strogatz, 1994, 210).
However, this result has only been proven for vector elds on a plane, that is, for 2 degrees of freedom.
Similarly, the literature on statistical mechanics has been critical of ergodicity, mainly on the
grounds of the KAM theorem. Yet, a careful look at the theorem shows that it can hardly be taken to
represent the general behaviour of classical mechanical systems; see above (§4.2 p.17), and Frigg (2009,
1005-6), Frigg and Werndl (2011, §5), Berkovitz et al. (2006, §4.1), and Sklar (1993, 174-5).
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4.3.2 Generic properties of the dynamics space
Non-integrability. Moving to the more general framework of topological dynamics, we nd a result
that stands for the typicality of chaotic behaviour in (Markus and Meyer, 1974, §3). ey showed that, in
the space of all normalized and innitely dierentiable Hamiltonian systems on a compact symplectic
manifold, most of the Hamiltonians are non-integrable, a property which is assumed to imply chaos.
Structural stability. Other results concern the notion of ‘structural stability’, indirectly related to
chaos. Roughly stated, a dynamical system (whether it be a continuous vector eld or a discrete map)
is said to be structurally stable if nearby systems have qualitatively the same dynamics. Smale (1966)
proved that structural stability is not a generic property for n-dimensional dieomorphisms when
n ≥ 2, or n-dimensional vector elds when n ≥ 3 (Wiggins, 2003, 164), (Ruelle, 1989, 43 fn36). e
connection between instability and the exponential divergence of nearby trajectories characteristic of
chaos is straightforward.
Hyperbolicity. Another result shows that hyperbolic behaviour is generic: the Kupka-Smale the-
orem. It proves that the hyperbolicity of all periodic points holds for a set of Cr dieomorphisms
that is a dense set in the C1 topology (Katok and Hasselbla (1997, 289,292,295) and Ruelle (1989, 46)).
‘Hyperbolicity’ refers to the presence of expanding and contracting directions of the derivative. e
presence of these directions produces exponential behaviour of trajectories on some set and, in the
end, the stretching and folding gives rise to complex long-term behaviour. is eectively makes the
dynamics appear random.
Ergodicity as a generic property. Another positive result comes from Oxtoby and Ulam (1941), who
discovered that ergodicity is generic for measure-preserving homeomorphisms on all compact mani-
folds. More specically, they discovered that the set of dynamical ows that are not ergodic belongs to
the rst category in the set of measure-preserving generalized dynamical ows.
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See also Frigg and Werndl (2011, §6) for a critique of the limited signicance of the result by (Markus and Meyer, 1974,
§4) against the typicality of ergodicity.
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Extension of the results for ergodicity and weak mixing. Further, these results have since been
extended. e genericity of ergodicity has been extended to automorphisms: Halmos (1944a) shows
that ergodicity is generic in the weak topology in the space of all automorphisms. Finally, a further
extension of the laer result is that the genericity of the stronger condition of weak mixing has also
been proved, both in homeomorphisms and in automorphisms (Katok and Stepin, 1970; Halmos, 1944b).
A discussion of these and other results can be found in (Alpern and Prasad, 2001). It is beyond the
scope and available space of this paper to properly discuss the applicability of these results: the tech-
nical notions that appear in the dierent results impose dierent constraints, e.g. the results applying
to homeomorphisms or to automorphisms, or the scope being restricted to compact manifolds. us,
the scope of the possible physical systems described requires further discussion (again, see Alpern and
Prasad, 2001 for discussion). en, these results can be studied case by case in dierent physical theo-
ries such as classical statistical mechanics, but also in any of the theories cited in Section 2. Be that as it
may, in what follows we will discuss the type of conditions involved and the corresponding signicance
that this approach can have.
5 Discussion: the Role of the Constraints
We have focused on and assessed a type of explanation, the typicality approach in statistical mechanics
which, as we have pointed out, is common in other areas of physics. e motivation for our analysis
has been that the typicality approach (1) can be considered an explanation of coarse-grained stable
behaviour, and (2) such stable, law-like, behaviour is explained almost independently of the specic
details of the underlying dynamics.
is is familiar in the literature on scientic explanation, where it has been studied how, in di-
verse seings, the details of the underlying level are irrelevant (see e.g. Baerman, 2001; Strevens,
2008, 2013; Rohwer and Rice, 2013; Baerman, 2018, 2019. )e typicality approach looks like a more
general yet less ne-grained explanation in comparison with the renormalization group explanations
of the universality of critical phenomena, in which most of the details of the micro-level turn out to
be irrelevant. Renormalization group techniques take into account the space of possible Hamiltonians,
and in the procedure of coarse-graining and removing irrelevant micro-level details they show that
for all Hamiltonians the system’s state-space trajectory converges to a xed point. e typicality ap-
proach, as we have seen, can be considered a mathematical explanation or, more specically, a statistical
explanation, of this sort. is quote by Strevens (2003, 62) clearly illustrates the underlying idea:
e value of a […] probability may come out the same on many dierent, competing stories about
20
fundamental physics. e probability of heads on a tossed coin, for example, is one half in Newto-
nian physics, quantum physics, and the physics of medieval impetus theory.
One might doubt that the typicality approach does provide a proper explanation. For a defence
of the legitimacy of typicality explanations see Wilhelm (forthcoming).
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We believe that a typicality
explanation, although probably not the best explanation, it fulls central desiderata that one would
expect from an explanation. At least in our particular case study it seems that, if the kind of explanation
we propose were successful,
20
we would have gained some insight on the existence of regularities in
the world.
Of course, in the cases presented, some specic dynamical law is assumed. e interesting point
is that, as we have argued, this does not imply that some specic dynamical law must be assumed. In
classical statistical mechanics, the facts
(i) that the results are supposed to hold for most of the dynamics, and
(ii) that the relevant typical dynamical property is some randomizing property,
independently support that, merely by imposing prior general constraints, a free evolution of a point in
phase space will display, in the long run, coarse-grained stable paerns.
en, the process that has been studied in this paper yields a further reduction of degrees of
freedom that occurs in the long run in coarse-grained levels. Now, the signicance of the typicality of
dynamics is conditional on the prior general constraints that in each case are imposed. For the only
law-like assumptions are found in such constraints. We refer for instance to the boundary conditions,
or to the kinematical conditions (spelled out below). A paradigmatic example of a condition that has
been implicitly presupposed, both in the results for the actual dynamics in §4.2 as well as in some of the
results that widened the range of the dynamics in §4.3, is the principle of conservation of energy. (For
Hamiltonian dynamical systems are closed measure-preserving systems in which energy is conserved.)
In general, the kind of constraints to which we refer are familiar in dierent physical theories. e point
is that they are not the usual dierential equations dictating the time-evolution of physical systems, but
rather conditions which are still ‘lawful’ (or ‘modal’, or ‘nomic’) in that they constrain the possibility
space. An illustrative standard example is that of a marble rolling on a bowl: its motion is constrained
to the surface of the bowl. A constraint such as the bowl is dierent from the guiding dynamics, but it
delimits the possible degrees of freedom.
21
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See Lazarovici and Reichert (2015, §6) for a complementary philosophical assessment of the typicality approach in statis-
tical mechanics, also in connection to the notion of law of nature. See (ibidem, §5) for further discussion of common objections
to the typicality approach.
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In this paper we only propose such kind of explanation, of course we are far from defending its actual success.
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And it is possible to also constrain the range of parameters of the system, to constrain the range of quantitative forms
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A classication of constraints and assessment of their import in complex dynamical systems is
(Hooker, 2013). An especially basic type of constraint are the holonomic constraints, which means that
they can be expressed purely geometrically, so that they are independent of the behaviour of the system.
ey can be wrien as some function of the space-time geometry, satisfying an equation of the form
f(r1, r2, ..., rn, t) = 0, where the ri are the system coordinates and t is time (Hooker, 2013, 19).
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e
distinction that we are interested in highlighting, between constraints and the guiding dynamics, is
oen neglected in modelling physical systems, because in practice it is not necessary to dierentiate
the constraints from the dynamics (what Hooker calls “the interaction dynamics”). Hence constraints
and dynamical laws are conated in the Lagrangian formalism: the dynamical law that describes the
motion—a dierential equation—encompasses the constraints, it “compresses constraint and interac-
tion information into a ow and in that sense suppresses the explicit details of the interactions and
constraints” (Hooker, 2013, 15).
e resulting picture becomes clearer aer characterizing the space of the kinematically and dy-
namically possible models. e kinematically possible is a space of functions that represent histories
of the system. Dene Ts as the class of all the kinematically possible trajectories in state-space. e
idea is that Ts delineates the subspace of “metaphysical possibilities consistent with the theory’s basic
ontological assumptions” (Pooley, 2013, 12). is is generally dened by specifying the independent
and dependent variables of the theory and the degree of smoothness of candidate functions, as well as
any boundary conditions that they must satisfy (Belot, 2011, 5).
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In the framework of classical me-
chanics, consider a model of gravitating point particles with distinct masses, as in (Belot, 2011, 7). A
point in the space of the kinematically possible models of the theory assigns to each of the particles a
worldline in spacetime, without worrying about whether the worldlines of each particle jointly satisfy
the Newtonian laws of motion. ere is then a subset of the kinematically possible models called the
set of dynamically possible models. is is a space of solutions which is a 6N -dimensional submani-
fold whose points correspond to the motions of particles that obey Newton’s laws. Such a submanifold
constrains us too much, to a single set of laws, i.e. the actual ones. In more detail, Pooley (2013, 12)
(see also ibidem, 40) says:
“In a coordinate-dependent formulation of Newtonian theory like that so far considered,
its dynamics can take. e eect of such constraints appears as constraints on variables (Hooker, 2013, 2).
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More precisely, “A constraint is holonomic if its local (momentary, nearby) dierential form is integrable to yield a global
constraint relation that is purely a maer of space-time geometry and independent of the system’s dynamical states, e.g. the
frictionless bowl as constraint for the rolling marble” (Hooker, 2013, 7, fn9).
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e whole space of metaphysical possibilities is thought to be too wide: it allows, for instance, that any function from
points in space to points in space qualies as a possible trajectory; thus, Ts follows from assumptions aimed at excluding
certain behaviour, i.e. certain conceptual possibilities not ruled out by logic.
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the [kinematically possible models] might be sets of inextendible smooth curves inR4 which
are nowhere tangent to surfaces of constant t (where (t, ~x) ∈ R4). e models assign
to the curves various parameters (m, …). Under the intended interpretation, the curves
represent possible trajectories of material particles, described with respect to a canoni-
cal coordinate system, and the parameters represent various dynamically relevant particle
properties, such as mass. e space of [dynamically possible models] consists of those sets
of curves that satisfy the standard form of Newton’s equations”
e constraints that determine the kinematically possible, then, are the only modal constraints, the
only conditions that play the role of laws.
An example ubiquitous in all of physics are the global continuous symmetries (which any dynam-
ical law obeys), which are related to the conservation of some quantity. e literature on symmetries
abounds in discussions on their status, but a standard view on symmetries is to take them as meta-
laws or, quoting Wigner (1960), ‘super-principles’. Notice that the symmetries can be exhibited by the
geometrical structure of space in physical theories (by its topological, ane, and metric structure). In
fact, Wigner highlighted that symmetry principles are grounded in the stable properties of the dening
structure of spacetime (Martin, 2003, 50). According to such a geometrical interpretation, the symme-
tries of the laws are interpreted as symmetries of spacetime itself; they codify “the geometrical structure
of the physical world” (Brading and Castellani, 2013, §5). To give an example, think of the homogene-
ity of space, assumed “in the physical description of the world since the beginning of modern science”
(ibidem, §2.1). Another example is the time-translation invariance, related with the aforementioned
conservation of energy via Noether’s theorems.
24 25
us, if in a certain seing the explanation based on the typicality of dynamics is correct, I want
to conclude with the moral that, in any account of laws of nature (such as those cited in footnote 1
or any other account), in order to explain the high degree of order (the ubiquity and extreme stability
of certain regularities) at least in such seing, one does not need to ontologically commit to the usual
governing dynamical laws. Instead, one can focus on accounting for conditions of a more general type,
the constraints discussed in this section, which would suce to explain the emergence of law-like be-
haviour. So, when the primitivist postulates (without much argument, as far as I know) laws of nature,
she can appeal to the present moral to at least aenuate the suspicion that the (according to some,
24
However, even if it is a paradigmatic example, we should keep in mind that it might not be true, according to general
relativity (see e.g. Maudlin et al., 2019).
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I recur to the same examples in an analogous discussion in (Filomeno, 2019b, §4.2.3). It is interesting to note that both
approaches converge at this point, while one starts from a result in chaos theory (Poincaré’s method of arbitrary functions)
while here we have started from the “neo-Boltzmannian” typicality explanation in statistical mechanics.
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mysterious) primitive entity postulated looks like a contrived, highly specic, set of governing dier-
ential equations.
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e deationist (a Humean, say), according to what I have suggested, is justied
in dispensing with some modal entities—the dynamical governing laws—although I do not see how
she could dispense with all modal notions, as long as she aims to explain the extremely regular and
apparently non-accidental paerns of the Humean mosaic. Some kind of justication should be given
by the Humean to the remaining general modal constraints.
27
e propensity theorist might also be
interested in picking up our conclusion, in order to suggest that those minimal constraints are to be
found in dispositional properties. Although what we have proposed could also be seen as a reductive
explanation of such propensities.
To recapitulate, in this paper I have:
(i) highlighted the common structure of explanation in certain projects in dierent elds of physics
(§1-2);
(ii) explicitly seen what is needed for such typicality explanation to be successful in classical statistical
mechanics (§3-4); and
(iii) argued that, in order to account for the emerging law-like behaviour, the specic form of the un-
derlying dynamical laws is irrelevant, while the constraints gain a prominent role (§5). e fact that in
certain contexts a free state-space evolution yields in the long run a stable reduction of further degrees
of freedom supports the thesis that stable paerns can occur without needing to postulate—to ontolog-
ically commit to—the usual set of governing dynamical equations. e constraints that characterize the
context, i.e. that dene the kinematically possible states, are le as the only modal constraints. Hence,
this shis the aention to the ontological nature of such kinematical constraints.
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(1877): 373–435.
Brading, Katherine, and Elena Castellani. “Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking.” In e Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2013. Spring 2013 edition.
Brown, Harvey R., and Jos Unk. “e Origins of Time-Asymmetry in ermodynamics: e Minus First Law.”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 32, 4 (2001): 525–538.
Callender, Craig. “e emergence and interpretation of probability in Bohmian mechanics.” Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38, 2 (2007): 351–370.
Carroll, John W. Laws of Nature. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Cartwright, Nancy. e Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Chadha, S, and Holger Bech Nielsen. “Lorentz invariance as a low energy phenomenon.” Nuclear Physics B 217,
1 (1983): 125–144.
Chakravary, Anjan. “Causal Realism: Events and Processes.” Erkenntnis 63, 1 (2005): 7–31.
Chkareuli, J.L., C.D. Frogga, and H.B. Nielsen. “Spontaneously Generated Tensor Field Gravity.” Nucl.Phys.
B848 (2011): 498–522.
Cohen, Jonathan, and Craig Callender. “A Beer Best System Account of Lawhood.” Philosophical Studies 145, 1
(2009): 1–34.
Dasgupta, Abhijit. “Mathematical Foundations of Randomness.” In Philosophy of Statistics (Handbook of the
Philosophy of Science: Volume 7), edited by Prasanta Bandyopadhyay, and Malcolm Forster. Elsevier, 2011.
Diaconis, Persi. “A Place for Philosophy? e Rise of Modeling in Statistics.” ar. Jour. Appl. Math. 56 (1998):
797–805.
Dretske, Fred I. “Laws of Nature.” Philosophy of Science 44, 2 (1977): 248–268.
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